We describe an alternative interpretation of the AGM postulates for belief change (Alchourrón et al., 1985; Gärdenfors, 1988) in a foundational framework of epistemic states suggested by Bochman (1997) . Though foundational contractions constitute a new kind of belief contractions, incompatible with AGM postulates, a broad class of preferential AGM contractions is shown to be revisionequivalent to foundational contractions and can actually be produced using a modification of the contraction operation on epistemic states. It is shown also that revisions of epistemic states determine a natural class of preferential AGM revisions, and that all the AGM postulates for revision can be satisfied by imposing reasonable restrictions on underlying epistemic states. As a result, the foundational theory of epistemic states is shown to provide a unification of the main approaches to belief change on a foundationalist basis.
Introduction
The AGM theory of belief revision [1, 9] can be seen as a true starting point in the study of belief change. It has suggested a systematic approach to the problem both in terms of general rationality postulates a belief change should satisfy and in describing semantic representations that conform to these postulates. According to the AGM theory, belief change is a process of revising (deductively closed) belief sets based on some selection function choosing among their maximal subsets that are consistent with the new data. The theory is usually considered as an instantiation of a coherentist approach to belief acceptance (see [10] ), according to which justifications, or reasons, of our beliefs should not be taken into account in performing belief change. An alternative, more foundational, approach has been suggested by a number of authors (see, e.g., [7, 13, 20] ). According to the latter, the corpus of beliefs is seen as generated by some (usually finite) set of propositions called its base. Changes of such base-generated belief sets are determined by changes in their underlying bases. Among other virtues, this approach has definite computational advantages and allows also to avoid some controversial features of the AGM theory, such as the famous postulate of recovery.
In this paper we will describe an alternative representation of the AGM theory in the general foundational framework of epistemic states suggested in [3] . To begin with, we describe belief change functions generated by contraction, expansion and revision operations on epistemic states, and compare them with corresponding AGM operations on belief sets. Then we will show how the AGM rationality postulates for contraction and revision can be interpreted in this foundational framework using certain plausible operations on epistemic states.
Epistemic states
The approach suggested in [3] is based on the notion of an epistemic state, given below. As is argued in [3] , this notion can be seen as a natural output of the representation of belief suggested in current theories of nonmonotonic reasoning. Definition 2.1. An epistemic state E is a set of deductively closed theories. 1 Each u ∈ E is called an admissible belief state of E.
Admissible belief states represent potential belief sets that are actually envisaged by the agent; they correspond to what is considered by the agent as serious possibilities. The very restriction on such possibilities indicates that actual and potential beliefs are correlated. As is shown in [3] , epistemic states can be described in terms of dependence relations holding between propositions. Such dependence relations reflect, in particular, justification relations among potential beliefs. In this way the framework of epistemic states allows us to represent a general foundationalist approach to belief change.
An epistemic state presupposes the following notion of belief acceptance: Definition 2.2. A proposition is believed in an epistemic state E if it belongs to all maximal belief states from E. The set of all propositions believed in E is called a belief set of E.
Epistemic states considered below will always form a continuous partial order with respect to set inclusion: the union of any chain of belief states from E will also belong to E. This will guarantee, in particular, correctness of the above definition, since any such epistemic state will have maximal belief states.
As a matter of fact, the AGM theory also presupposes the above criterion of belief acceptance with respect to propositions that 'survive' a change. Thus, a proposition will belong to a contracted belief state according to AGM if it belongs to all (selected) maximal subtheories of the initial state that do not include the proposition being contracted. On our approach, this is how we should accept our beliefs from the very beginning.
Belief change operations are defined in [3] as functions from epistemic states to epistemic states. As an important 'by-product', they produce changes in their associated belief sets. In other words, changes of an epistemic state generate corresponding belief change functions on its belief sets. Such belief change functions will be the main subject of the present study.
Consequence relations as representations of epistemic states
In [3] a syntactic description of epistemic states was given in the framework of a general sequent calculus called Scott consequence relations. Scott consequence relation is a 'symmetric' generalization of Tarski consequence relation that involves rules of the form a b, where a and b are sets of propositions. It was shown that the 'multiple-conclusion' character of Scott sequents is essential for providing an adequate representation of iterated and multiple belief change operations on epistemic states. Still, it was demonstrated also that for 'one-step' changes or, more exactly, for determining belief change functions associated with an epistemic state, we can safely restrict the formalism to ordinary Tarski consequence relations. Since belief change functions constitute the main concern of the AGM theory, this simplifying representation will be helpful in establishing the relationship between our framework and the AGM approach.
In what follows we will denote propositions by A, B, . . . We consider below Tarski consequence relations in a language containing the usual classical connectives {∨, ∧, ¬, →}. will denote the classical entailment with respect to these connectives.
A Tarski consequence relation is called supraclassical if it satisfies the following condition:
(Supraclassicality) If a A, then a A.
Thus, a Tarski consequence relation is supraclassical if it subsumes classical inference. As can be easily shown, supraclassicality requires all theories of a consequence relation to be deductively closed sets. On the syntactic side, supraclassicality allows for replacement of logically equivalent propositions in premises and conclusions of the rules. It allows also to replace a set of premises by their conjunction: a A will always be equivalent to a A. This implies, in particular, that a supraclassical consequence relation can also be viewed as a certain binary relation among classical propositions. We will often use this fact implicitly in what follows. A Tarski consequence relation will be called classical if it is supraclassical and satisfies the deduction theorem: a, A B always implies a A → B. Such consequence relations are commonly used in the literature on belief change for describing the underlying logic. Classical entailment coincides with the least classical consequence relation. In what follows, Th will denote a provability operator of some classical Tarski consequence relation, while Th c will denote the provability operator corresponding to the classical entailment.
For any supraclassical consequence relation there exists a greatest classical consequence relation included in it. We will denote the latter by Th and call it the classical subrelation of . It is defined as follows:
The classical subrelation of a consequence relation will determine the 'internal logic' of the corresponding epistemic state and associated belief change functions. Now, any epistemic state E generates a supraclassical Tarski consequence relation E defined as follows:
Accordingly, supraclassical consequence relations can be used as a formalism providing a syntactic representation of epistemic states. The consequence relation associated with an epistemic state can be seen as expressing basic dependence relations holding between our beliefs. On this understanding, A B can also be interpreted as saying "Belief in A depends on belief in B".
Remark.
Notice that the direction of dependence is usually opposite to that of inference; if we accept A as our new belief, and A is our only ground for accepting A ∨ B, then A ∨ B depends on A in our epistemic state, and hence A ∨ B A will belong to the associated consequence relation.
In view of the correspondence between epistemic states and consequence relations, all the notions definable for epistemic states can be translated into the terminology of consequence relations. In particular, we introduce the following Definition 2.3. A proposition A will be said to be believed in a consequence relation , if it belongs to all maximal consistent theories of . The set of all believed propositions will be called a belief set of and denoted by K .
Notice that according to the above definition, the belief set K is always consistent. In what follows, we will write a as a shorthand for a ⊥, where ⊥ is an arbitrary classical contradiction. The following lemma gives a syntactic description of the belief set of a consequence relation (see [3] ).
Lemma 2.1. If is a supraclassical consequence relation, then
A ∈ K iff A ∧ B implies B ,
for any proposition B.
A proposition A will be said to be disbelieved in a consequence relation if A holds. This means that the proposition does not belong to any theory of . Then the above lemma shows, in effect, that beliefs associated with a consequence relation are uniquely determined by its set of disbeliefs.
Note. As we will see in more detail later, the representation of epistemic states in terms of consequence relations can be viewed as a generalization of the AGM paradigm obtained by replacing its underlying classical consequence relation (together with the associated selection function) by a supraclassical one. The possibility of such a generalization of the basic AGM setting was envisaged, for example, by David Makinson in [18] .
We introduce below some special kinds of consequence relations that will be useful in what follows.
Determination
A consequence relation will be called determinate if it has a greatest consistent theory. In this case the belief set K will coincide with this greatest theory. Determinate consequence relations correspond to 'coherent' epistemic states having a unique greatest belief state. As we will see, determination is presupposed by the AGM theory as part of its basic 'rationality postulates'. The following simple lemma gives a syntactic description of determination:
Lemma 2.2. A consequence relation is determinate iff it satisfies:
(Determination) If a , then A , for some A ∈ a.
As can be easily seen, a proposition is believed in a determinate consequence relation if and only if it is not disbelieved in it. In other words, we have
Lemma 2.3. If is a determinate consequence relation, then
A ∈ K if and only if A .
Linearity
A consequence relation will be called linear if the set of its theories is linearly ordered by inclusion. Clearly, any linear consequence relation will already be determinate. The following lemma gives two useful syntactic characterizations of linearity.
Lemma 2.4.
( 
Consequence relations and epistemic entrenchment
Linear consequence relations are intimately connected with epistemic entrenchment orders from [11] : any linear consequence relation, viewed as a relation among propositions, will be an epistemic entrenchment relation. Due to this connection, the corresponding theory of belief change on linear epistemic states will provide a representation of the 'full' AGM theory. Note also that determinate consequence relations correspond in this sense to partial entrenchment relations from [17] . A detailed comparison between supraclassical consequence relations, on the one hand, and epistemic entrenchment relations and their generalizations, on the other, is given in [6] .
Contractions
A contraction of a proposition A from an epistemic state E, denoted by E − A, is defined in [3] as an operation on epistemic states that consists in removing all admissible belief states from E that include A. It results in disbelieving A. A syntactic counterpart of this operation is a contraction operation on consequence relations described below. If A belongs to all theories of (that is, if A holds), contraction of the latter with respect to A will produce an inconsistent consequence relation with the set of all propositions as its only theory. In order to avoid this situation, we will stipulate that if A holds, a contraction of with respect to A will retain the consequence relation intact. This 'opportunistic' policy is implicit in all current approaches to belief change. Accordingly, this stipulation will facilitate comparison with AGM contractions.
Foundational belief contractions
A contraction of a consequence relation (or an epistemic state) produces a change in its belief set. Consequently, any consequence relation generates a certain belief contraction function, namely the function assigning each proposition A the belief set of −A . In what follows, we will denote the latter belief set by K − A. This set can be seen as a result of contracting the belief set K with respect to A. Any such belief contraction function generated by some consequence relation will be called foundational. We will say also that a foundational belief contraction is determinate (respectively, linear) if it is generated by a determinate (respectively, linear) consequence relation. In what follows, we will often assume that the underlying consequence relation is fixed and denote the corresponding foundational belief contraction simply by K − A.
Comparing foundational and AGM contractions
To begin with, the following simple result shows that the paradigm shift suggested by the foundational framework of epistemic states is not as drastic as it may seem.
Lemma 3.3. If is a determinate consequence relation, then, for any A, K − A is an intersection of all maximal subsets of K that do not imply A (with respect to ).
The above result shows that foundational belief contraction can be seen as a generalization of full meet contraction in the AGM sense (see [1] ): in the determinate case the contracted belief set coincides with the intersection of all its maximal subsets that do not imply the contracted proposition. The only difference with the full meet AGM contraction in this respect is that the underlying consequence relation is not classical (as it is in the AGM), but only supraclassical. This makes full meet contraction nontrivial (and hence eliminates the need for an additional selection mechanism).
We are going now to compare foundational belief contractions with the AGM contractions. The following are Gärdenfors' postulates of contraction. They are formulated with respect to a fixed belief set K and some underlying classical consequence relation Th.
To begin with, let us clarify the role of the underlying classical consequence relation Th in contractions. As can be seen, there are only three AGM postulates that involve Th, namely (K-1), (K-4) and (K-5). And as is shown in [4] in a more general context, for any given contraction function, these postulates uniquely determine its associated 'internal' logic Th. Moreover, we are going to show that in the case of foundational contractions, these postulates amount to identifying this internal logic with the classical subrelation Th of the underlying Tarski consequence relation.
We will say that a foundational belief contraction function respects a classical consequence relation Th, if it satisfies (K-1), (K-4) and (K-5) with respect to Th. Then the following result shows that this can hold if and only if Th coincides with Th . Thus, a foundational belief contraction generated by a consequence relation satisfies the postulates (K-1), (K-4) and (K-6) with respect to Th . Even under this identification, however, it will satisfy in general only one half of the AGM postulates, namely (K-1), (K-4), (K-5) and (K-7). The following example demonstrates violation of the rest: Example 3.1. Let us consider an epistemic state consisting of the following theories:
This epistemic state is not determinate and, as is easy to see, K E = Th(p ∨ q). Contracting p from this state will give us a new belief set Th(q). Thus, both inclusion (K-2) and vacuity (K-3) fail. In addition, contracting q gives Th(∅) as a belief set, and hence recovery (K-6) also fails.
The situation improves, however, if we consider contractions of determinate epistemic states. Then the corresponding determinate foundational belief contraction will satisfy also the AGM postulates of inclusion (K-2) and vacuity (K-3). As a result, it will satisfy in this case all the AGM postulates except recovery (K-6) and the last 'connectedness' postulate (K-8). This means, in particular, that it is a withdrawal function in the sense of Makinson [18] , since it satisfies all the basic AGM postulates except the postulate of recovery.
Unfortunately, the problem of a complete characterization for foundational belief contraction functions in terms of 'rationality postulates' remains still open. Nevertheless, we will describe below a class of contraction functions that provides a 'common ground' for both foundational and AGM contractions. This description will help us in determining relationships between the two.
Preferential belief contractions
As we said earlier, foundational belief contraction can be seen as a kind of a full meet contraction, except that it is based on a supraclassical consequence relation. As was shown in [1] , however, full meet contraction with respect to a classical consequence relation is too 'poor' to give a reasonable solution for the belief contraction problem. So, the authors of [1] suggested to use instead partial meet contraction defined as an intersection of some selected maximal subtheories of the belief set. In the relational case, such selected theories are preferred theories with respect to some preference relation on the maximal subtheories.
In [4, 5] a notion of a generalized epistemic state was introduced that can be seen as a common generalization of the AGM framework and our epistemic states. Generalized epistemic states were defined as sets of admissible belief states ordered by a preference relation. It was shown that contractions of such 'preferential' epistemic states produce belief contraction functions that are completely characterized by the following postulates:
We will call such functions preferential belief contractions in what follows. It was shown also that if the underlying epistemic state is determinate, then the corresponding determinate preferential contractions can be characterized by adding the AGM postulates of inclusion (K-2) and vacuity (K-3) (notice that (K-2f) will already be derivable from the latter).
Practically all the above postulates are known from the literature on belief change. Apart from the original AGM postulates (K-1), (K-4), (K-5) and (K-7), we have the postulate of failure (K-3f) introduced in [8] , partial antitony (K-P) studied already in [1] , as well as two postulates (K-7c) and (K-8c) introduced by Hans Rott in [21] as 'contraction counterparts' of the basic rules for nonmonotonic inference.
As can be seen, the above postulates preserve much of the 'rationality' behind AGM contractions. This may even create an impression that our foundational contraction functions are a certain generalization of the AGM contractions that do not satisfy recovery. This is not so, however. It is easy to show that all foundational contractions satisfy also the following characteristic property:
In fact, there are some reasonable grounds for conjecturing that adding this postulate to the above list would provide the required complete characterization for foundational contractions. Anyway, the validity of the persistence postulate is sufficient for establishing that foundational belief contractions are incomparable with AGM contractions: on the one hand, the former do not satisfy recovery (K-6) and connectedness (K-8); on the other hand, persistence (K-8f) does not follow even from the full list of the AGM postulates. Thus, there are 'fully rational' AGM contractions that are not foundational contractions in our sense. Moreover, the following result shows that persistence cannot even be added to the basic AGM postulates, on pain of trivialization:
Theorem 3.5. A contraction function satisfies the basic AGM postulates and persistence (K-8f) if and only if it is a full meet contraction.
Thus, foundational contractions are also AGM contractions only in the trivial case of full meet contractions. Consequently, our framework produces an alternative understanding of belief contractions that is not subsumed by the AGM theory. Still, we will show later that AGM contractions are representable in our framework via a certain combination of belief change operations on epistemic states.
Severe withdrawal
As we have seen, among the supplementary AGM postulates our foundational contraction functions satisfy (K-7), but not (K-8). It turns out, however, that foundational belief contractions generated by linear consequence relations satisfy this postulate. Moreover, in this case our belief contractions will coincide with severe withdrawals suggested recently by Rott and Pagnucco [23] . A similar notion, called mild contraction has been introduced by Levi in [16] .
As is shown in [23] , a characterization of severe withdrawals can be obtained by accepting the basic AGM postulates, except recovery, and the following two postulates:
Note that (K-7) and (K-8) follow from the above postulates.
The following representation result can be easily discerned from the relevant representation results, proved by Rott and Pagnucco [23] , that establish a correspondence between severe withdrawals and epistemic entrenchment relations (see their Observation 19) . Nevertheless, we will supply in Appendix A a relatively short direct proof.
Theorem 3.6. A contraction function is a severe withdrawal iff it is a linear foundational contraction.
It is interesting to note that both Rott and Pagnucco [23] and Levi [16] give a broadly coherentist justification for their contractions. The above result shows, however, that a foundational approach can suggest here a viable and natural alternative to coherentism.
Revision-equivalence
It was shown in [18] that there is a uniform way of imposing recovery on belief withdrawal functions: for any such function we can construct a 'revision-equivalent' contraction function satisfying all the basic AGM postulates. In this section we will use this construction for establishing a correspondence between foundational contractions and a certain interesting class of AGM contractions.
Two belief contraction functions − 1 and − 2 will be called revision-equivalent if, for any A,
As was shown in [18] , any equivalence class of withdrawal functions with respect to the above equivalence contains a unique AGM contraction. In fact, for any withdrawal function −, its revision-equivalent AGM contraction ÷ can be defined as follows:
In view of the above correspondence, any foundational contraction has a revisionequivalent AGM contraction. Not all AGM contractions can be obtained in this way, however, and the following definition gives a description of such contractions. Thus, the characterization of preferential AGM contractions is obtained from that for ordinary AGM contractions by weakening the last AGM postulate (K-8). Now, using the above definition of AGM contractions in terms of withdrawals, it can be easily checked that any foundational contraction corresponds in this sense to some preferential AGM contraction. Moreover, we are going to show that any such AGM contraction is generated by some foundational contraction.
The following result can be seen as the main result of this section:
Theorem 3.7. Any preferential AGM contraction is revision-equivalent to some determinate foundational contraction.
We will use the above result in the next section in order to give a constructive representation of preferential AGM contractions in our framework.
Rational AGM contractions
A contraction function satisfying all the AGM postulates will be called a rational AGM contraction. As was shown in [23] , any such contraction is revision-equivalent to a severe withdrawal and vice versa. Due to our earlier results, this establishes a revision-equivalence of rational AGM contractions and linear foundational contractions. In fact, in the linear case AGM contractions, foundational contractions and epistemic entrenchment relations are interdefinable. A detailed description of the interconnections between these notions in the linear case is given in [23] .
Expansions
On the account suggested in [3] , there exist a number of plausible ways to expand epistemic states with new beliefs. In many cases, the differences will influence only iterated belief changes. Nevertheless, such differences between various kinds of expansions can be seen as the main varying parameter in our general approach to belief change.
In this section we will consider an expansion operation on consequence relations that will be especially suitable for representing AGM belief change operations. Compared with expansion operations studied in [3] , it will produce smaller changes in the underlying epistemic state, though will generate the same resulting belief set.
To simplify the notation, in this section Th will invariably denote the classical entailment operator Th c .
Weak expansions
Weak expansion, introduced below, can be seen as a minimal and most simple expansion operation on consequence relations. It amounts to adding propositions to all their maximal theories.
Definition 4.1. Let w be a set of propositions, T a set of all theories of a consequence relation , and T m a set of maximal consistent theories of . Then a weak expansion of with respect to w, denoted by +w , is a consequence relation determined by the set of theories
Thus, a weak expansion of a consequence relation with respect to w is produced by extending the set of its theories with new theories obtained by adding w to the maximal theories of . This operation is different from that of a basic expansion, studied in [3] , in that the latter amounts to adding w to all theories of a consequence relation. Nevertheless, the restriction to maximal theories is still sufficient for producing identical 'expanded' belief sets.
As can be easily checked, weak expansion with respect to a finite set of propositions is equivalent to an expansion with respect to its conjunction. So, finite multiple expansions are reducible to singular expansions.
As for contractions, expansions of a consequence relation produce corresponding changes in its belief set. For any consequence relation , we will denote by K + w the set of all propositions believed in +w , that is K +w .
K +A can be seen as a result of expanding the belief set K with A. Note, however, that if ¬A belongs to some maximal consistent theory of , this theory will still be a maximal consistent theory of +A . Consequently, in this case A will not belong to the 'expanded' belief set K + A. In particular, if ¬A is believed in , all the added theories in +A will be inconsistent, and hence a weak expansion of with respect to A does not produce any effect in this case.
To exclude the above situations, let us introduce the following definition:
A set of propositions w will be said to be admissible for a consequence relation , if w is consistent with all theories of .
As can be easily seen, a proposition A is admissible for a consequence relation if and only if ¬A is disbelieved in (that is, if ¬A holds). Now, if w is admissible with respect to , then K + w will be an intersection of all maximal theories of the form Th(u, A), where u is some maximal theory of . This means, in particular, that the new belief set will indeed be a certain expansion of the source belief set, and it will include also A:
Lemma 4.1. If a set of propositions w is admissible for a consequence relation , then
However, even in the admissible case the reverse inclusion does not in general hold. This is because even if u is a maximal consistent theory of , Th(u ∪ w) is not always a maximal consistent theory of +w . A suitable counterexample can be found in [3] ; though given for basic expansions, it will be appropriate also for weak expansions.
Finally, if a consequence relation is determinate, and w is admissible for it, then the expansion of with respect to w will amount to adding to a new theory Th(K ∪ w). In other words, in this case expansion results in a straightforward addition of the new propositions to the belief set:
If is determinate, and w is admissible for , then +w is also determinate and
Thus, in the determinate case the underlying epistemic state plays no role in determining the resulting belief set, since it always amounts to a direct addition of new propositions to the source belief set. In other words, in this case our expansions function as expansions of belief sets in the sense of Gärdenfors [9] . This fact will give us later the desired representation of AGM belief revision functions.
Recovering contractions
If K is a deductively closed set containing a proposition A, and v a maximal theory included in K that does not contain A, then, as is well known (see [1] ), v contains implications A → B, for all B ∈ K. This 'greedy' feature of maximal classical subtheories is a source of the much disputed recovery postulate (K-6) of AGM contraction operations: if A is first contracted from a belief set and then is added again, then the initial belief set is 'recovered'.
It has been argued sometimes that the recovery is a feature specific to a coherentist approach to belief change. Indeed, so far as we are seeking to find maximal coherent subsets of belief sets that do not imply some proposition, there seems to be nothing to prevent inclusion of the above 'recovering implications' into such subsets. It is true also that base contractions, as well as our foundational contractions, invalidate recovery. Still, we will show below that acceptance of the recovery postulate does not necessarily imply adherence to coherentism. More exactly, we will briefly describe now how it is possible to 'rationalize' this recovery property in our foundational framework using a certain modification of the contraction operation.
The recovery property does not hold for contraction operations on epistemic states simply because not all subtheories of a belief set are considered as admissible. As a result, contractions are not in general 'recoverable': by contracting some proposition A from our belief set we can delete also some other beliefs (e.g., those that have provided a justification for the proposition being deleted) that will not be restored even if we immediately add A again. In many cases such a behavior is reasonable, since the new addition of A may be justified, for example, by some brand new grounds or evidence, and we do not want to restore our previous reasons for believing in A. Still, it may be a case that we were simply wrong in deleting A, and want to restore now our previous belief state. In this case it would be helpful if the original state were 'remembered' in some form in the contracted epistemic state in order to permit its recovery.
Actually, a quite similar idea was already used by Nebel [20] in the framework of base change: in order to obtain recovery for a contraction of A from K, the contracted belief set K − A should be extended to include A → K, where the latter will denote the set of implications A → B, for all B ∈ K. The added set of implications assigns the contraction a feature of remembering the previous belief set; as a result, subsequent addition of A will restore K in a principal case. Below we will extend this idea to contraction operations on consequence relations. As can be seen, ÷A is obtained from −A by adding new theories of the form Th(u ∪ A → K), for all maximal theories u of that do not contain A. Despite this, it is easy to show that A is still disbelieved in ÷A , so this is indeed a certain contraction function in our sense. However, expanding ÷A with respect to A will give a belief set that includes K. Consequently, the recovering contraction validates recovery for belief sets. Actually, we are going to show now that the recovering contraction provides an adequate representation for the AGM contraction functions. Thus, the following theorem shows that any preferential AGM contraction is representable in this way.
Theorem 4.3. A contraction function is a preferential AGM contraction iff it is generated by a recovering contraction on some determinate consequence relation.
The above result provides, in effect, a foundationalist representation for the whole class of preferential AGM contractions.
Remark.
It is interesting to note that the class of preferential AGM contractions as such does not acquire a natural semantic characterization in terms of AGM models. Thus, the most natural candidate, relational selection functions on subsets of the belief set (see [1] ) give raise to preferential AGM contractions in our sense, but the latter do not provide a complete characterization of this class of models; some further conditions need to be added in order to achieve completeness. Actually, Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] have spent much efforts in an attempt to give a complete characterization for such relational AGM contractions, but the problem has not been resolved. Some deep reasons for this difficulty are given in [5] . A complete characterization of relational AGM contractions in the finite case was given by Rott in [22] .
As a special case of the above foundational representation of preferential AGM contractions, the following result provides a similar representation for 'full' AGM contractions:
Corollary 4.4. A belief contraction function is a rational AGM contraction iff it is generated by a recovering contraction on some linear consequence relation.
Thus, a broad range of AGM contraction functions can be represented in the foundational framework of epistemic states.
Revisions
A well-known principle suggested by Isaac Levi and called Levi identity in [9] , identifies a revision of a belief set with respect to a proposition A with a sequence of changes consisting of contracting ¬A and subsequent expansion with respect to A. This principle can be immediately generalized to corresponding operations on epistemic states and consequence relations. Notice that contraction of ¬A always produces disbelief in ¬A, and hence A will always be admissible for ¬A . Moreover, A will always belong to the revised belief set, as desired.
As before, we will denote by K * A the belief set of * A . This set will be considered as a result of revising the belief set K with respect to A. A detailed description of such generated belief revision functions will be given below.
Note that even in the determinate case Levi identity for revised consequence relations does not imply Levi identity for belief set mentioned at the beginning of the section. In other words, K * A is not always equal to Th({A}∪(K −¬A)). This is due to the fact that the underlying contraction of ¬A may produce a non-determinate consequence relation, and in this case the subsequent addition of A may not behave as an AGM expansion on the intermediate contracted belief set (see [3] for more details).
Preferential belief revision
As before, revisions of a consequence relation generate a corresponding belief revision function on its belief set. In this section we will give a description of such generated belief revision functions.
Given a belief set K and a classical consequence relation Th, the AGM belief revision functions are characterized by the following postulates (see [9] ).
Let us check first which of the above postulates are valid for our notion of revision. To simplify the discussion, we will consider in what follows only the case of a consistent belief set K. Then it turns out that our derived revision function on belief sets satisfies all the above postulates, except (K*4) and (K*8). Violation of the latter stems already from the fact that we admit epistemic states that are not determinate. Still, such revision functions satisfy some weaker versions of these postulates, namely (K*4c) and (K*8c) given in the next definition: 
It turns out that any preferential belief revision function is generated by some epistemic state, and hence the above postulates provide a complete characterization for the latter.
Theorem 5.1. A belief revision function on a belief set K with respect to Th is preferential if and only if it is generated by some consequence relation such that Th = Th and K = K .
Due to the above theorem, belief revision functions generated by revisions of epistemic states can be seen as a generalization of AGM revisions. Moreover, we will show below that in order to satisfy the rest of the AGM postulates for revision, we need only to restrict the class of generating consequence relations.
Preferential revision functions constitute a very natural and regular kind of belief revisions. In particular, we will see later that in the general correspondence between belief revision and nonmonotonic inference established in [12] , such revision functions constitute an exact counterpart of preferential inference relations from [15] . Unfortunately, just as for preferential AGM contractions, preferential belief revision functions do not have a simple characterization in terms of AGM models. Thus, all the postulates of preferential revision are valid for relational AGM models in which the selection function is based on a preference relation among subtheories of a belief set. However, these postulates do not give a complete characterization for revisions in this class of models (see below). At present, a complete description for the latter is given only for a finite case in [14] .
Our next result shows that adding postulate (K*4) amounts to restricting generating consequence relations to determinate ones.
Theorem 5.2. A belief revision function satisfies the AGM postulates (K*1)-(K*7)
and (K*8c) iff it is generated by some determinate consequence relation.
Relational revisions
If is a determinate consequence relation with a belief set K, then maximal theories of * A are precisely revisions of K with respect to A in the sense of Lindström and Rabinowicz [17] . In other words, the theory of relational belief revision from [17] is naturally 'embeddable' into our framework of belief revision on determinate consequence relations. Moreover, our approach shares with [17] an idea that different options arising in revising belief sets should not be boiled down to a single solution, but must be kept separately. Further details about the correspondence between the two theories can be found in [6] .
Finally, to satisfy all AGM rationality postulates for revision, we need to restrict further the class of generating consequence relations. The proof of the following result can be easily discerned from the corresponding representation result for AGM revisions given in [12] .
Theorem 5.3. A revision function satisfies all the AGM postulates iff it is determined by some linear consequence relation.
Summing up the above results, it can be said that sufficiently rich AGM belief revision functions fit nicely into our framework and obtain thereby an alternative, foundational representation. In other words, AGM theory of revision (more exactly, the AGM rationality postulates for revision functions) turns out to admit a genuinely foundationalist interpretation.
Belief revision and nonmonotonic inference
We establish in this section a connection between preferential revision functions and nonmonotonic inference relations.
As was argued by Gärdenfors and Makinson in [19] , belief revision and nonmonotonic inference are actually 'two sides of the same coin'. Thus, any revision function on a fixed belief set K generates the following nonmonotonic inference relation:
Moving in the other direction, given a nonmonotonic inference relation | ∼, there is a natural way of defining its 'belief set', K |∼ as the set of propositions that are nonmonotonically inferred in | ∼ (see [19] ; the authors attributed the idea to Hans Rott):
In addition, notice that if M is a model of a nonmonotonic inference relation | ∼, then ¬A | ∼ ⊥ expresses the fact that A holds in all states of M. Consequently, such propositions can be seen as describing the internal logic of the nonmonotonic inference relation. Accordingly (and here we depart from the treatment in [12, 19] ), we can 'fix' also the underlying logic Th |∼ of a nonmonotonic inference relation to be the least classical Tarski consequence relation containing the set {A | ¬A | ∼ ⊥}. Among other convenient consequences, this choice will provide for the validity of the consistency preservation postulate (K*5). Now, for any preferential inference relation | ∼, we can define the associated belief revision function on K |∼ (with respect to Th |∼ ) as follows:
It was shown in [12] that if a revision function satisfies all Gärdenfors' postulates, the associated nonmonotonic inference relation will be rational (see [15] ). Our postulates are weaker, however, and the following result shows that they precisely correspond to preferential inference relations from [15] .
Theorem 5.4.
( The above result shows, in effect, that preferential inference relations also have a natural belief-revision counterpart, namely revisions of epistemic states and their associated belief revision functions. As we already mentioned, the class of preferential revisions is 'inconvenient' for representation in terms of AGM models. The reasons for this can now be clarified if we notice that relational AGM models exactly correspond to a special kind of preferential models from [15] , namely to injective (or Shoham) models in which different states are labeled with different worlds. As was established in [15] , such models are insufficient for representing all preferential inference relations.
Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to clarify relations between the AGM theory of belief change and foundational theory of epistemic change suggested in [3] . The results of the study can be summarized as follows.
To begin with, we have described belief change functions generated by operations of contraction, expansion and revision of epistemic states. The comparison of these functions with their AGM counterparts has established a number of useful facts. First, we have shown that foundational belief contractions constitute a different kind of belief contractions, incompatible with AGM 'rationality postulates' on pain of trivialization. It was shown also that severe withdrawals suggested in [23] (and mild contractions from [16] ) coincide with a special class of foundational contractions generated by linear epistemic states.
Despite the difference between the two kinds of contractions, it has turned out that foundational contractions are revision-equivalent to a broad and natural class of what we called preferential AGM contractions obtained by weakening the last AGM postulate (K-8). Moreover, we have shown that this class of AGM contractions can actually be produced in our foundational framework using a certain modification of the contraction operation on epistemic states, called a recovering contraction.
Finally, we have shown that revisions of epistemic states produce a natural class of preferential AGM revision functions; moreover, the rest of the AGM postulates can be satisfied by imposing reasonable restrictions on underlying epistemic states.
Generally speaking, the above results demonstrate that the AGM theory, as reflected in the 'rationality postulates' it sanctions, is not necessarily tied to the coherentist paradigm and can actually be given a foundationalist interpretation. This shows also that the framework of epistemic states can subsume the AGM belief change paradigm. In addition, it was demonstrated in [3] that the rival base change approach is also representable in this framework using another special class of consequence relations and different belief change operations. So, the suggested foundational theory of belief change provides, in effect, a unification of the two principal belief revision paradigms on a (moderately) foundationalist basis. In addition, it suggests a natural way of extending these approaches to iterated belief change operations.
Appendix A. Proofs of the main results
In some of the proofs below we use the notion of a semi-classical consequence relation defined as a supraclassical consequence relation satisfying the following weak form of reasoning by cases:
Semi-classical consequence relations were introduced in [2] for describing nonmonotonic inference relations. They provide also a useful tool in studying belief change.
A semantic characterization of semi-classical consequence relation is based on a certain feature of its maximal theories. A set u will be called A-saturated if Th c (u, ¬A) is a maximal deductively closed set (a 'world'). Then it can be shown that a consequence relation is semi-classical if and only if, for any proposition A, if u is a maximal theory that does not contain A, then u is A-saturated. In particular, any maximal theory of a semiclassical consequence relation is a world.
Lemma 2.4.
(
1) A consequence relation is linear iff, for any propositions A and B, either A B or B A. (2) A supraclassical consequence relation is linear iff a B holds only if
Proof. It is easy to check that both the above conditions hold if the set of theories of a consequence relation is linearly ordered. Now assume that is not linear and u and v are two its incomparable theories. Then there must exist propositions A and B such that Proof. Since all theories of are closed also with respect to Th , the associated belief contraction function clearly satisfies (K-1) and (K-5) with respect to Th . In addition, if A / ∈ Th (∅), that is, A, the contraction of A produces a change in that results in disbelieving A. Consequently, A / ∈ K − A. Thus, the corresponding belief contraction function respects Th .
Assume now that the belief contraction function respects some consequence relation Th. Notice that by our stipulation, a contraction of a consequence relation with respect to A will retain belief in A if and only if A holds. Now, (K-1) implies that if A ∈ Th(∅), then, in particular, A ∈ K − A. This is possible only if A, and hence A ∈ Th (∅). In addition, (K-4) gives us that if A / ∈ Th(∅), then A ∈ K − A, and consequently A. Thus, Th and Th have the same provable propositions, and this is sufficient for the coincidence of these two classical consequence relations.
Theorem 3.5. A contraction function satisfies the basic AGM postulates and persistence (K-8f) if and only if it is a full meet contraction.
Proof. If B ∈ K, then A → B ∈ K ÷ A by recovery, and hence K ÷ A ∧ B ⊆ K ÷ A by persistence. Consequently, a contacting function satisfying the above postulates satisfies also the following Monotony property:
But as was shown in [1] , the latter property, taken together with the basic AGM postulates, provides an exact characterization for full meet contractions.
Theorem 3.6. A contraction function is a severe withdrawal iff it is a linear foundational contraction.
Proof. Let us define the following consequence relation:
To begin with, we will show that this is a linear supraclassical consequence relation. Supraclassicality (and hence Reflexivity) immediately follows from (K-1). For Monotonicity, it is sufficient to observe that if a / ∈ K − B, then, for any C, (a ∪ {C}) / ∈ K − B (again, by (K-1) ).
Cut. Assume that a B and a, B C hold for our consequence relation. A number of cases should be considered.
then we have again a C. So, we only have to consider the case when B / ∈ K − C. Then linearity (K-8l) gives us K − C ⊆ K − B. Consequently, if a / ∈ K − B, then a / ∈ K − C and therefore a C. Otherwise, the validity of a B implies B ∈ K − B. But then by success (K-4) B ∈ Th(∅) and consequently B ∈ K − C by (K-1)-a contradiction with our earlier assumption that B / ∈ K − C. Therefore, Cut also holds. Thus, the above definition determines a supraclassical consequence relation. Moreover, if a / ∈ K − B, then closure implies that A / ∈ K − B, for some A ∈ a. Consequently, this consequence relation is linear. In addition, inclusion and vacuity imply that K is a maximal theory.
To conclude the proof, we need to show that B ∈ K − A iff B belongs to all maximal theories of the consequence relation that do not contain A. Due to linearity, this amounts to the following condition:
Now, the implication from left to right follows from inclusion, while the reverse implication is an immediate consequence of failure.
Theorem 3.7. Any preferential AGM contraction is revision-equivalent to some determinate foundational contraction.
Proof. To begin with, for a given preferential AGM contraction ÷, we will define the following relation:
We are going to show that the above definition determines a supraclassical consequence relation.
Supraclassicality (and hence Reflexivity) follows immediately from closure (K-1). 
Monotonicity. Assume that
Therefore, A → C belongs to K ÷ A ∧ C, which is equivalent to A C. This shows that Cut holds.
Thus, is a supraclassical consequence relation. In addition, it is easy to check that the belief set K is a theory of . Indeed, if A ∈ K and A B, then A → B ∈ K ÷ A ∧ B, and hence A → B ∈ K by Inclusion. Consequently, B ∈ K, since K is deductively closed. This means that K is closed with respect to the rules of .
The above constructed consequence relation is still not the consequence relation we seek, since it is not determinate. So, we are going to transform the latter into a determinate consequence relation. Let us denote by * the consequence relation defined as follows:
As can be easily checked, * is obtained from by restricting the set of its theories to theories that are included in K. Clearly, * will already be determinate, with K as its greatest theory. To complete the proof, we are going to show that the foundational belief contraction -generated by * is revision-equivalent to ÷.
Assume first that B ∈ K ÷ A. We need to show that B ∈ K and A ∨ B ∈ K − A. Now, the first condition follows immediately by Inclusion, while the second one amounts to showing that, for any C, if C ∧ (A ∨ B) * A, then C * A (see Theorem 3.2 above). So, let us assume that C ∧ (A ∨ B) * A holds for some C. If C / ∈ K, then C * A follows immediately. So, let us assume that C ∈ K and hence C ∧ (A ∨ B) A, which is equivalent to (C ∧B) → A ∈ K ÷A ∧C. In addition, B ∈ K ÷A implies A ∨B ∈ K ÷A, and therefore A ∨ B ∈ K ÷ A ∧ C by Partial Antitony. Combined with the previous condition, this gives us that both A ∨ B and (C ∧ B) → A belong to K ÷ A ∧ C. Therefore C → A should also belong to K ÷ A ∧ C, and hence C A. Therefore, C * A, as required.
In the other direction, assume that B ∈ K and A ∨ B ∈ K − A. Recall that the latter condition means that, for any C, if C ∧ (A ∨ B) * A, then C * A. Let us substitute B → A for C. Then C ∧ (A ∨ B) * A will trivially hold, and consequently either B → A / ∈ K, or B → A A. In the first case we will have A / ∈ K, and hence B ∈ K ÷ A (since B belongs to K. In the second case we have (B → A) → A ∈ K ÷ A, which is equivalent to A ∨ B ∈ K ÷ A. In addition, since B ∈ K, recovery implies A → B ∈ K ÷ A. Combining these two conditions, we conclude B ∈ K ÷ A. So, -is revision-equivalent to ÷. This concludes the proof.
Theorem 4.3. A contraction function is a preferential AGM contraction iff it is generated by a recovering contraction on some determinate consequence relation.
Proof. To begin with, it is easy to check that the recovering contraction on a determinate consequence relation generates a contraction function on belief sets satisfying all the postulates for preferential AGM contractions. Also, it was shown earlier (see Theorem 3.7) that for any preferential AGM contraction ÷ there exists a revisionequivalent determinate foundational contraction. The relevant determinate consequence relation * was constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.7 by restricting the set of theories of a certain consequence relation to theories that are included in its belief set K. For the present proof, we need to establish a further property of , namely that it is semi-classical.
Assume that we have both C ∧ (A ∨ B) A and C ∧ (A ∨ ¬B) A. By definition of , these conditions imply, respectively, (C ∧ B) → A ∈ K ÷ A ∧ C and (C ∧ ¬B) → A ∈ K ÷ A ∧ C. Now, using closure (K-1), we can combine these conditions to obtain C → A ∈ K ÷ A ∧ C, that is, C A. Thus, is a semi-classical consequence relation.
Notice that since * was obtained by restricting the set of theories of to theories that are included in K, for any proposition A, if A ∈ K, then maximal theories of that do not contain A will also be maximal such theories in * . Since is semi-classical, any such theory u will be A-saturated, that is, Th(u, ¬A) will be a maximal deductively closed set.
Let us denote by T A the set of all theories of the form Th(u, ¬A), where u ranges over maximal theories of * −A . Similarly, T K A will denote the set of all theories of the form K ∩ Th(u, ¬A), where, as before, u ranges over maximal theories of * −A . Note that any theory from T K A is equal to Th(u ∪ A → K). In other words, T K A is precisely the set of 'new' theories produced by the recovering contraction of with respect to A. Now, the fact that ÷ is revision-equivalent to a foundational contraction on * can be reformulated as saying that, for any A, K ÷ A is an intersection of K and all theories from T A . If A / ∈ K, then this set obviously coincides with K, a result produced also by the recovering contraction in this case. So, let as assume that A ∈ K. Our earlier observation implies then that any theory from T A will be then a maximal deductively closed set. Moreover, since K is incompatible with theories from T A , all theories in T K A will be maximal in T K A . Consequently, K ÷ A will coincide with the intersection of all theories from T K A . But the latter is nothing other than the belief set of ÷A , and we are done.
Corollary 4.4. A belief contraction function is a rational AGM contraction iff it is generated by a recovering contraction on some linear consequence relation.
Proof. To begin with, it can be immediately checked that a recovering contraction of a linear consequence relation validates the last AGM postulate (K-8). So, it produces a rational AGM contraction function. Since any rational AGM contraction ÷ is revision-equivalent to some linear foundational contraction −, there must exists a linear consequence relation such that, for any A,
Since is linear, K − A coincides with a unique maximal theory of that does not contain A. Accordingly, the recovering contraction of with respect to A will remove all theories greater than K − A and add a single new theory Th(K − A, A → K) which will form the new belief set. But the latter theory is equal to K ∩ Th(K − A, ¬A), and therefore the new belief set will coincide with K ÷ A. This completes the proof. Proof. The direction from right to left was established in the previous lemma. Now, for a given preferential belief revision function, we define the following consequence relation:
We are going to show that this is a semi-classical consequence relation. Supraclassicality is immediate from (K*6).
Monotonicity.
, so we can apply (K*7) to conclude that ¬A belongs to Th(K * ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C), ¬(A ∧ B ∧ ¬C)), which implies, in turn, ¬(A ∧ C) ∈ K * ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C) by (K*1). But the latter is equivalent to A ∧ C B, so Monotonicity holds.
Cut. Assume that A B and A ∧ B C, that is, ¬A ∈ K * ¬(A ∧ B) and ¬(A ∧ B) ∈ K * ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C). Applying (K*7) and (K*1) to the first condition, we obtain that ¬A ∨ B should belong to K * ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C). Combined with the second condition, this gives us ¬A ∈ K * ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C) by (K*1). Consequently, ¬(A ∧ C) also belongs to K * ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C). Now we can apply (K*8c) to infer that ¬A belongs to K * ¬(A ∧ B ∧ C) ∧ ¬(A ∧ C), the latter being equal to K * ¬(A ∧ C) by (K*6). So, we can conclude A C, and therefore Cut holds.
Semi-classicality. Assume C, (A ∨ B) A and C, (A ∨ ¬B) A, that amount, respectively, to ¬(C ∧ (A ∨ B) ) ∈ K * ¬(A ∧ C) and ¬(C ∧ (A ∨ ¬B)) ∈ K * ¬(A ∧ C). Applying (K*1), we immediately obtain ¬C ∈ K * ¬(A ∧ C), that is, C A. Thus, semiclassicality holds.
So, is a semi-classical consequence relation. To complete the proof, we need to show that it generates our belief revision function, that is, B ∈ K * A if and only if B is believed in * A . The latter means, in turn, that B belongs to all maximal theories of the form Th c (u, A), where u ranges over theories of that are consistent with A.
Assume first B ∈ K * A, for some A and B. We are going to show that A → B belongs to all maximal theories of that are consistent with A. Assume, on the contrary, that u is such a theory, though it does not contain A → B. Then u, A → B ¬A, due to maximality of u. Therefore there must exist C ∈ u such that C, A → B ¬A, that is, ¬(C ∧ (A → B) ∈ K * ¬(C ∧ ¬A). Due to (K*1), the latter implies, in particular, ¬C ∨ ¬B ∈ K * ¬(C ∧ ¬A). Now, applying (K*7) to B ∈ K * A, we obtain also C → B ∈ K * ¬(C ∧ ¬A). Combining the last two conditions, we infer ¬C ∈ K * ¬(C ∧ ¬A), which is equivalent to C A. But the latter contradicts the assumption that u is consistent with A. Thus, A → B belongs to all maximal theories u that are consistent with A. Consequently, B will belong to all maximal theories of the form Th c (u, A), and hence B is believed in * A .
Assume B / ∈ K * A. Then A ∧ B / ∈ K * A, and hence ¬(A ∧ B) ¬A. Let u be a maximal theory of containing ¬(A ∧ B) that is consistent with A. Since is semi-classical u should be saturated with respect to ¬A, and hence Th(A, u) is a world. Consequently, it is a maximal theory of * A . In addition, ¬B ∈ Th(A, u), since both A and ¬(A ∧ B) belong to it. Therefore, B is not believed in * A .
Thus, we have shown that, for any A, K * A coincides with K * A, and hence generates our belief revision function. In addition, since is semi-classical, its maximal theories are worlds, and hence A ∈ K if and only if ¬A ⊥. But the latter is equivalent to A ∈ K * , so K coincides with K * . By inclusion and vacuity, the latter set coincides with K, so K is the belief set of .
Finally, we have to show that Th coincides with Th . To this end, it is sufficient to demonstrate that they contain the same provable propositions. Now, if A ∈ Th(∅), then A ∈ K * ¬A by (K*1), and hence ⊥ ∈ K * ¬A by (K*2) and (K*1). But the latter is equivalent to A, and hence A ∈ Th (∅). In addition, the reverse inclusion amounts precisely to consistency preservation (K*5).
Theorem 5.2.
A belief revision function satisfies (K*1)-(K*7) and (K*8c) iff it is generated by some determinate consequence relation.
Proof. To begin with, it is easy to check that a belief revision function generated by a determinate consequence relation satisfies (K*4). Moving in the other direction, if a belief revision function satisfies the above postulates, it is generated by a consequence relation defined in the proof of the preceding theorem. This consequence relation is not, in general, determinate. So we will construct the required determinate relation by restricting the theories of to theories included in K (as was shown, K is a theory of ). Formally, we define a new consequence relation d as follows:
Clearly, the above defined consequence relation will already be determinate with K as its greatest theory. We are going to show that this consequence relation generates precisely our belief revision function.
Assume first that B ∈ K * A. As in the preceding proof, in order to show that B is believed in ∈ K * A. We will consider two cases. Assume first that ¬A / ∈ K. Due to (K*4), K * A will coincide in this case with Th(K, A). On the other hand, revision of d with respect to A will also amount in this case to expanding its belief set, K, to Th(K, A), and hence B will not be believed in d * A . So, let us consider the case when ¬A ∈ K. Then ¬(A ∧ B) will also belong to K. In addition, B / ∈ K * A implies A ∧ B / ∈ K, and hence ¬(A ∧ B) ¬A by the definition of . Therefore ¬(A ∧ B) d ¬A, and hence there exists a theory u of d containing ¬(A ∧ B) that is consistent with A. Note that ¬B ∈ Th(A, u). Consequently, any theory of the form Th(A, v) which is greater than Th(A, u) will also contain ¬B. So, some of the maximal theories of this form will contain ¬B. Therefore B is not believed in d * A . This completes the proof. 
Proof. (i)
As is shown, in effect, in [19] , the above 'translations' establish a one-to-one correspondence between the postulates (K*1), (K*2), (K*6), (K*7) and (K*8c), on the one hand, and the characteristic postulates of preferential inference relations given in [15] , on the other. More exactly, (K*1) corresponds to And and Right Weakening, (K*2) corresponds to Reflexivity, (K*6) to Left Logical Equivalence, (K*7) to Or (as is shown in [19] ), and (K*8c) to Cautious Monotony. So, we need only to check the accompanying identities for belief sets and underlying logics.
In order to show that Th coincides with Th |∼ * , it is sufficient to demonstrate that they contain the same provable propositions. Now, if A ∈ Th(∅), then A ∈ K * ¬A by (K*1), and hence ⊥ ∈ K * ¬A by (K*2) and (K*1). But the latter amounts to ¬A | ∼ * ⊥, and hence A ∈ Th |∼ * (∅). In addition, the reverse inclusion amounts precisely to (K*5).
Finally, notice that K |∼ * coincides with K * . Consequently, (K*3) implies that K includes K |∼ * , while (K*4c) gives the reverse inclusion. So, in this case K = K |∼ * .
(ii) Here we need to check the validity of all the postulates for preferential belief revision functions. To begin with, (K*2) follows from Reflexivity for | ∼, (K*3) and (K*7) are consequences of Conditionalization (rule S in [15] ), (K*4c) and (K*8c) follows from Cautious Monotony, while (K*5) is an immediate consequence of our definition of Th |∼ . So, it remains only to check postulates (K*1) and (K*6) that are less trivial. . Now the desired result follows by the rule Equivalence from [15] .
